A rare Second World War Norway operations D.S.M. group of seven awarded to Leading Seaman H. T. Gibbs, Royal Navy, who was decorated for his gallantry ashore at Aandalsnes in April 1940
Distinguished Service Medal, G.VI.R. (J. 111284 H. T. Gibbs, L. Smn., R.N.); 1939-45 Star; Atlantic Star; Africa Star; Italy Star; War Medal 1939-45; Royal Navy L.S. & G.C., G.VI.R., 1st issue (J. 111284 H. T. Gibbs, L.S., H.M.S. Revenge), minor official correction to ship name on the last, nearly extremely fine (7) £800-1000

D.S.M. London Gazette 5 July 1940: ‘For courage, enterprise and devotion to duty in action at Aandalsnes.’

Henry Thomas Gibbs was decorated for his gallantry ashore in a naval party at Aandalsnes in April 1940, and is mentioned by Captain S. W. Roskill, D.S.C., R.N., in the following extract from The War at Sea 1939-45:

‘The minor operation now put in train with the object of occupying Aalesund was designed to neutralise the adjacent stretches of the Indreled and to create a diversion while the troops of “Operation Maurice” were landing at Namsos. The four sloops Auckland, Black Swan, Flamingo and Bittern sailed from Rosyth on the 14 and 15 April with 700 seamen and marines, hastily collected from ships which were refitting at the time. Amongst these men was Leading Seaman H. T. Gibbs. These little ships, overcrowded and heavily loaded, met very bad weather and had to put into Invergordon for shelter. While there they received Admiralty instructions to divert the landing parties to Aandalsnes. They sailed again on the 16th and arrived at their destination late the following evening. By 7 a.m. next morning the naval landing parties had been disembarked and the ships sailed to take another naval party to the small port of Molde and some guns to be mounted at Aalesund. Up to this point the operation had fared fortunately, but after the 20th April, Aandalsnes was bombed almost daily and with ever-increasing weight and effect. The little seaport was soon almost completely destroyed. The naval landing parties remained ashore and became absorbed in the larger expedition called “Sickle”, whose brief career will now be traced.

Admiral Edward Collins with the cruisers Galatea, Arethusa, the A.A. cruisers Carlisle and Curacoa, and two destroyers sailed from Rosyth early on 17 April with 1,000 troops on board. These were landed without incident at Molde and Aandalsnes the next evening, the 18th, and the cruisers left again in the small hours of the following morning. On the 20th bombing started in earnest, and the Carlisle and Curacoa bore the chief brunt of almost continuous attacks until the latter was hit and badly damaged on the 24th. The experiences of these two specially equipped ships were repeated and confirmed by other A.A. ships stationed at Namsos and at Aandalsnes during these difficult days. Their radar sets were rendered almost useless by the high cliffs and surrounding land; the same cliffs prevented any appreciable warning being received visually; the narrow waters left little room for manoeuvring, yet it was essential for the ships to remain under way; ammunition expenditure was extremely high and no stocks were available for replenishment locally. When a ship had fired the greater part of her ammunition she must return to a home base. Moreover the actual protection afforded to the bases by the gunfire of the guard ships was slight, and was chiefly due to the enemy concentrating his attacks on the ships. A like number of guns deployed ashore would have been far less vulnerable to the enemy’s attacks and would have given the ports better protection; but there were no heavy anti-aircraft guns ashore. Moreover these anti-aircraft cruisers and sloops were costly and valuable ships which, used in the manner for which they had been designed, rendered excellent service, particularly on our coastal and short sea convoy routes. To use them as floating substitutes for properly organised base defences was only justifiable because every other form of defence against air attack was lacking. From the point of view of economy of force it could, Admiral Forbes was soon to point out, hardly be justified.

The work of the bases themselves could be done only under cover of darkness. Unloading could not start until 9 p.m. and must finish by 2 a.m. to enable transport and storeships to get clear of the fjords before daylight. And at that time of year, in those latitudes, the nights were rapidly shortening.

Such, in brief, were the problems which faced the base staffs at every point of landing in central Norway during April 1940. It was not the fault of the Army that properly organised anti-aircraft batteries could not be set up on shore, nor that of the Air Force that fighter protection could not be provided. The necessary equipment existed at home, though by no means in plentiful quantities, but it could not be embarked, transported by sea, disembarked and installed on shore in a strange land, much of which was still under deep snow, in a matter of days. Every effort was, in fact, made to get guns and fighter aircraft across to defend these bases, but the problem was too big and too difficult to yield to any amount of improvisation. And with the bases daily, even hourly, under the lash of the enemy’s air power the military operations could not possibly prosper.

Reinforcements for “Sickle”, however, arrived in the midst of the bombing on 21 April and from that convoy the storeship Cedarbank was torpedoed and sunk, the only success obtained by enemy submarines against all our troop and store convoys bound for Norway during these operations. The following day the Arethusa brought stores, light anti-aircraft guns and the advance party of the R.A.F. for an extemperised fighter station which it was hoped to establish on a frozen lake nearby. She landed all these and left again within four hours. In London further reinforcement of the “Sickle” force was still intended, and Admiral Edward Collins therefore left Rosyth on 22nd with the Galatea, Sheffield, Glasgow and six destroyers carrying 2,200 troops, all of whom were successfully landed at Molde and Aandalsnes the next day.

The final reinforcement of 1,500 men and 300 tons of stores was carried over by Admiral Layton in the Manchester, Birmingham, York and three destroyers from Rosyth on the 24th. They too were put ashore without loss. The Navy could do no more and, as Admiral Edward Collins noted, ‘it is remarkable that my ships have now carried out this operation three times without molestation’. The arrival of these reinforcements coincided with the utter failure of the hoped-for fighter protection from the frozen lake. The Gladiators were transported by the Glorious (Captain G. D'Oyly-Hughes), recently returned from the Mediterranean, and flown ashore, only to be overwhelmed by enemy bombers within a few hours. By this time the realities of the situation were plain. On the 27th the first definite proposals to evacuate “Sickle” were sent home. Next day the Cabinet took the decision to abandon central Norway altogether and arrangements were put in hand to evacuate the 12,000 men, including the 700 strong Naval party, so hopefully carried to central Norway.’

Gibbs received his D.S.M. at a Buckingham Palace investiture held in March 1941.